
In another post I wrote back in February, I criticized British academics who wrote boring books. Therefore, I would be rather hypocritical if I then turned around and criticized an American academic for writing a book that was very readable but had a minimum amount of substance. In this context, I will explain my critique of Robert Kaplan's Monsoon: The Indian Ocean and the Future of American Power. Whether or not this book is too simple depends upon how much someone already knows about International Relations (IR). If someone has never studied the subject, the book will be very informative about a region of the world that has already become a major focal point for the United States, especially for the American Navy. If someone has studied IR a bit, then the book may still be beneficial to read since it explains the historical background and current trajectories of several countries and cities around the ocean. However, the book will probably read like Kaplan's travel journal with his long narratives and descriptions of the different cities he visited. If the reader is looking for the book's meat, then he or she should probably just skim these large sections. If the IR student has substantially studied India, Indonesia, or China, then this book will probably insult his or her intelligence. There simply isn't enough new information in the book to make it worth the already informed student's while. Reading a quick synopsis is probably more appropriate. Overall, the book is best for those who either know nothing about IR or who only know a little about the region. For my purposes, since I've concentrated more on European, Middle Eastern, and African issues than Indian and Chinese issues, the book was a descent introduction to the region. I still wish there had been more meat about the region's politics instead of the long passages about Kaplan's irrelevant travel adventures, but these stories do help illustrate his points, for better or worse.
As a general overview of the book, Kaplan introduces the reader to several countries along the Indian Ocean including Oman, Pakistan, India, Sri Lanka, Burma, Indonesia, and Zanzibar. He concentrates not so much on the country as a whole but on individual cities and port developments along the coast. This concentration tends to show the internal strife within a country between the coastal cities that have always been more cosmopolitan due to trade and the rural interior that has been more isolated and xenophobic. These dynamics lead to interesting internal political developments. Meanwhile, there is a huge power-play between India, China, and the United States throughout the ocean. Unlike in the Atlantic and Pacific, land creates several shipping bottlenecks throughout the Indian Ocean. The most critical bottlenecks are the Strait of Hormuz between Oman and Iran and the Strait of Malacca in Indonesia. These areas are vulnerable to pirate attacks and slow down trade between India, China, and the oil-rich Middle East. For China and India to continue growing steadily, they desperately need to develop more trade links within the India Ocean and its raw materials from Africa and the Middle East. China has tried to work with Burma to build an oil pipeline and highways/railways that would link the landlocked southwestern China to the Bay of Bengal. Meanwhile, India is trying to build better links that would crisscross Afghanistan so that they could get oil and raw materials from Asia's interior to ports in Iran. In this light, a stable Afghanistan could be very beneficial to both China and India so that they could use this country to transport their goods to and from the Indian Ocean. Thus, American blood and treasure being used to build a stable Afghan government would probably benefit potential enemies more than secure America's strategic interests. India or China could harass each other as they vie for the same territory, or they could cooperate. This cooperation would be very beneficial to both parties, but it would extremely limit the United State's ability to extend its influence into the region. Meanwhile, there are plenty of opportunities for America to build stronger relationships with the Chinese and Indians. This multipolar environment could allow several opportunities for diplomatic failure in the next 50 years or so, and the consequences could be rather tragic since so many actors have nuclear weapons.
Though there are several chapters that I thoroughly enjoyed, one chapter annoyed the crap out of me. Kaplan tried to give a historical narrative for the region stretching from the rise of Islam to the Portuguese dominance on the ocean. I hated his analysis. First, according to him, the area was peaceful before the Portuguese arrived, but history tells us that there were many wars between naval powers on the ocean long before the Portuguese arrived. Second, Kaplan said that the Portuguese went to the Indian Ocean in order to conquer Islam. He said it was another 'crusade.' This whole narrative about European hatred for Islam is reminiscent of Huntington's Clash of Civilizations, but it is incredibly misleading. The Portuguese cooperated with the region's Muslims just as much as they competed with them. Also, the Portuguese tried to find a way around the Horn of Africa not to encircle the Muslims in the Middle East but to outmaneuver their 'Christian' rival's trade hub in Venice. If their main competitor was Christian, then how could it be a 'crusade'? Yes, the Portuguese treated the Muslims horribly, but their actions appear more like unruly pirates far from home and less like holy warriors on crusade. I almost stopped reading the book in this opening chapter because I was so tired of Kaplan's 'West versus Muslim' narrative, but the rest of the book was much better once I got passed that chapter.
No comments:
Post a Comment